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Abstract: Substantial increases in retail concentration (particularly in Europe) raise concerns 
about the welfare implications for consumers. In a formal model, we argue that retailer market 
power reduces upstream firms incentives to introduce new products. On the basis of a survey 
of firms in German food manufacturing, the results of a negative binomial regression model 
supports the proposition of a detrimental effect of retailer market power on product 
innovations. This effect is mitigated if manufacturing firms also have some market power 
(countervailing power). Innovations are positively related to firm’s market share in food 
manufacturing.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The last couple of decades have seen an increased retail concentration around the world, 
particularly in Europe. In 1992, the top ten grocers in Europe accounted for 27.8 per cent of 
the market, but for 36.2 per cent only five years later (Clarke, et al., 2002). Views on the 
welfare implications of this severe change are controversial. Consumers might benefit 
because larger stores (owned by larger retailer chains) offer more product choices under more 
convenient conditions. Further, they could use their buying power to obtain lower prices from 
suppliers which could then be passed on to consumers. On the other hand, there is concern 
that powerful retailers might exert their market power in the product market and raise 
consumer prices. In addition, it has repeatedly been hypothesized that buyer power may force 
manufacturers “to reduce investment in new products or product improvements, advertising 
and brand building” (EC, 1999, p.4). Similarly, a recent FTC report suggests that consumers 
“could be adversely affected by the exercise of buyer power in the long run, if prices to 
suppliers are reduced below the competitive level and if the suppliers respond by under-
investing in innovation or production” (FTC, 2000, p. 57 and Footnote 190).  
This paper focuses on the last issue and aims at analysing whether buyer power affects 
upstream incentives to invest in product innovation. Particular emphasis will be given to the 
food sector for three reasons. Firstly, as Clarke et al. (2002) emphasize, among all areas of 
retailing, food retailing stands out to have experienced the most significant changes in market 
structure during the last decades. Secondly, because of the size and importance of food 
retailing, these changes will have the greatest impact on consumers. Finally, the food sector is 
particularly interesting because of the large number of innovations per year. According to 
Madakom (2001) 32.478 new products have been introduced into the German food market in 
year 2000, whereas innovative activity is heterogeneously among food industry sectors.  
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the relationship between buyer power and 
innovation incentives in a theoretical model in Section 2. Data and the empirical evidence is 
reported in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
   4
2. The model 
 
The impact of retailer power on the rate of product innovation in manufacturing can most 
easily be investigated in a model based on Sullivan (1997). The author develops a model of 
product innovation in a vertically related market by investigating separately the behaviour of 
retailers and manufacturers. In the following, we do not discuss the full model in detail but 
focus on retailers only and modify Sullivan’s model by introducing imperfect competition.  
We assume retailers to act competitively on the product market but to have monopsonistic 
power with respect to input markets (manufacturers). The retailer’s problem is to decide how 
many new products to accept (X) from manufacturers and to determine the quantity of each 
product (q) and thus the total store quantity (Q = qX). In period t, the retailer decides to take 
Xt new products without knowing, whether or not this product will be successful in the 
market. If the product is successful, it can be sold for two periods, if it is not successful, it can 
only be sold in the first period but will not be accepted by consumers in the second period. 
The fraction of successful products, ρ, is treated as deterministic. The total number of 
products offered by a retailer in period t thus is,  t t
T
t X X X + = −1 ρ  but only 
) ( ˆ
1 t t t X X X + = − ρ  are products attractive to consumers. If the retailer offers a large number 
of attractive products, consumers are willing to pay a higher price for products at a store. 
Formally, consumer demand is represented by the inverse demand function  ) ˆ (X P , with 
0 ˆ >
X P  and  0 ˆ ˆ <
X X P , where 
X Pˆ  and 
X X P ˆ ˆ  represent the first and second derivative of  ) ˆ (X P , 
respectively.
2  
A retailer faces two sorts of costs: operating costs K and costs associated with purchasing the 
product from the manufacturer W. Operating costs are increasing in the number of new 
products accepted as well as in the total store quantity:  0 , 0 , 0 , 0 > > > > QQ XX Q X K K K K .
3 
Due to monopsonistic market power, input prices are not given but vary with the quantity of 
products purchased:  0 > Q W .  
                                                 
2   Shopping at a store with a small number of products increases the chance that one of the desired products 
is not available, in which case the consumer must either buy a less-than-optimal brand or visit another 
store. Offering a larger number of products may further satisfy consumer’s taste for variety.  0 ˆ ˆ <
X X P  
implies that the reduction in search costs from an additional product is declining in the number of 
products. Note that the probability that an additional product will be in the consumer’s optimal bundle is 
smaller when the number of products is large. Secondly, adding another products to a fixed amount of 
shelf space makes it more difficult for a consumer to find the product in the store (“in store search costs”). 
3   When many new products are added to the store, it is more difficult to rearrange the shelves and manage 
additional products, which implies KXX > 0.    5
The retailers profit function for the two periods t and t+1 is: 
  ) , ( )] ( ) ˆ ( [ ) , ( )] ( ) ˆ ( [ 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + − − + − − = t t t t t t t t t t Q X K Q W X P Q X K Q W X P π  (1) 
Profit maximisation implies choosing X and Q such that the following first order conditions 
must be satisfied: 
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The following diagram illustrates this choice of X and Q in a steady state situation 
( 1 1, ˆ ˆ
+ + = = t t t t Q Q X X ).  
 
Diagram 1: The retailer’s optimal X and Q 
 
With respect to the total store quantity, the retailer will choose Q such that output price  ) ˆ (X P  
equals total marginal costs. Total marginal costs include marginal operation costs KQ as well 
as marginal costs associated with purchasing products from manufacturers (WQQ + W(Q)). 
Similarly, the optimal number of products chosen is also determined by the intersection of 
marginal costs KX and marginal revenue ( ) ˆ ( 2 ˆ X QP
X ρ ). The marginal revenue curve is 
downward sloping since  0 ˆ ˆ <
X X P .  
Diagram 1 also allows to compare Q
* and X
* with a situation where the retailer does not have 
monopsonistic power (Q
C* and X
C*). In a competitive market, the marginal costs of total store 
quantity will be lower (since WQ = 0) which increases the optimal quantity (Q
C* > Q
*). An 
increase in Q shifts the marginal revenue curve in the second part of diagram 1, which again 
raises the optimal number of products (X
C* > X
*). This process in reinforced by the fact that an 
increase in X further raises the consumers willingness to pay ( ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( X P X P
C > ).  
X
C* X
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Modelling the manufacturer’s behaviour does not add anything important to the model. We 
can conclude that retailer market power reduces the demand for new products compared to a 
competitive retailer market. The basic argument is that concentration among buyers leads to a 
strategic reduction in purchases with the aim of reducing prices. This lowers manufacturers 
profits and reduces incentives for product innovation.
4  
Increasing unit costs are the primary source of buyer power in this model. Additional 
arguments supporting a relationship between buyer power and suppliers profits and 
innovation have been suggested. Katz (1987) stresses that larger buyers can more credibly 
threaten to integrate backwards thereby exerting more pressure on a supplier. Scherer and 
Ross (1990) argue that a large buyer’s purchasing order is more likely to break up potential 
collusion between suppliers. Within the framework of bilateral negotiations between suppliers 
and downstream firms, Inderst and Wey (2002) consider a large buyer’s ability of threatening 
to withdraw his demand. If negotiations fails, suppliers with a fixed capacity in the short run 
will have difficulties in selling their output. Finally, market power of downstream firms might 
also allow them to force upstream firms into contractual arrangements such as signing 
exclusive supply contracts. Stefanides (1997) has shown that these contracts will reduce 
upstream innovation in that the foreclosed suppliers incur the disadvantages of low-scale 
production and are discouraged from innovating. These effects, although not explicitly 
integrated in the formal model, will have to be considered when interpreting the results of the 
following empirical model. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Evidence 
 
In spring 2002 we conducted a survey among food industry firms in Germany. Aim was to 
consider the companies’ competitive environment as well as the determinants of their 
innovation activities. Special attention was given to changes in retailers’ market power and its 
influence on manufacturers’ product innovative activity. According to convention of Eurostat 
and OECD (1997) product innovation is defined as new or noticeably improved products the 
company has introduced within the last three years, thus it is not necessarily a radical 
innovation.   
We mailed questionnaires to 539 companies in food manufacturing listed in the „Presse-
Taschenbuch Ernährung”, a handbook on food industry which is published by the Federation 
                                                 
4   For a recent summary of the empirical literature linking market concentration to buyer and supplier 
profitability see Ellison and Snyder (2001).   7
of German Food and Drink Industries (BVE). From the 539 questionnaires, 119 (22 %) were 
returned. For further analysis only 87 questionnaires could be used due to missing data. 
Dataset consists of companies of all sectors of food industry, federal states and size 
categories. The majority of respondents belong to bakery, meat processing, brewery and dairy 
sector. Least companies are from malthouse, condiments or sugar industry. Most of the 
respondents are small- and medium-sized companies (66 per cent), however firm size ranges 
from 3 persons employed up to 8500. Thus, sample is a good representation of the German 
food industry. 
As endogenous variable and indicator for innovative activity we use the number of new 
products (NNP) the companies’ have introduced into the market within the period 1999 to 
2001. The definition and descriptive statistics of all variables used is reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Definition and descriptive statistics of variables used 
 
   Mean  Minimum 
   (Std.Dev.)  Maximum 
 
Number of new products introduced between 1999 and 2001 (NNP)   13.057  0 
   (18.490)  120 
 
Number of products in the product assortment in 2001 (#PROD)   226.873  1 
                        476.248  3,500 
 
Retailer market power (RMP). Respondents were asked to evaluate    3.471  1 
retailers’ pricing pressure on a scale from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).  (1.150)  5 
  
Market share of  the firm in its primary product market in 2001 (MAS). 3.161  1 
(1.430)                     5 
 
Dummy variable for the degree of competition in food manufacturing (COMP). 0.195  0 
Respondents were asked to rank the degree of competition in their own  (0.399)  1 
industry on a scale from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). The dummy variable 
is set equal to 1 if the respondent characterizes competition to be high or  
very high and is 0 otherwise. 
 
Advertising to sales ratio (ASR). Respondents were asked to classify firm’s  2.943  1 
advertising to sales ratio on the following scale: (1) if ratio is < 1 %;    (1.673)  8 
(2) if ratio is between 1 and <2.5%; (3) if ratio is between 2.5 and <5% 
(4) if ratio is between 5 and <7.5 %; (5) if ratio is between 7.5 and <10%; 
(6) if ratio is between 10 and <12.5%; (7) if ratio is between 12.5 and <15%; 
(8) if ratio is ≥ 15%. 
 
Ratio of expenditures for R&D in total sales (R&D). Respondents were asked  2.241  0 
to classify firm’s ratio of R&D to sales on the following scale: (0) if ratio is  (1.941)  7 
0; (1) if ratio is between 0 and <0.25%; (2) if ratio is between 0.25 and <0.5% 
(3) if ratio is between 0.5 and <0.75 %; (4) if ratio is between 0.75 and <1%; 
(5) if ratio is between 1 and <1.5%; (6) if ratio is between 1.5 and <2%; (7) if 
ratio is ≥ 2%. 
   8
Share of exports in total sales (EXP) * 100.    10.205  0 
(13.564)                   74 
 
Size class of firm sales (SIZE). Respondents were asked to classify      4.172  1 
firm sales on the following scale: (1) if sales are < 1 Mio. €/year    (1.838)  8 
(2) if sales are between 1 and < 5 Mio. €/year; (3) if sales are between  
5 and < 25 Mio. €/year; (4) if sales are between 25 and < 50 Mio. €/year; 
(5) if sales are between 50 and < 100 Mio. €/year; (6) if sales are between 
100 and < 250 Mio. €/year; (7) if sales are between 250 and < 500  
Mio. €/year; (8) if sales are ≥ 500 Mio. €/year 
 
Market growth (GROWTH) * 100. Average growth rate of industry real   8.664  -39.027 




Given the specific nature of our dependent variable (non-negative, discrete observations), 
count data models will be used for estimation purposes. The bench-mark model for count 
data, the Poisson regression model, specifies that yi is drawn from a Poisson distribution with 











= = x  where  i i β λ
'
i x = ln .
5 
The expected number of events per time period (innovations within the three-year-period) is 
given by 




i i x x = = = ] [ ] [ . This implicit assumed equality of the conditional 
mean and variance functions ( ] [ ] [ i i x x i i y Var y E = ) in the Poisson model (Poisson 
assumption) is typically taken to be the major shortcoming of this methods. Cameron and 
Trivedi (1990) have suggested a number of tests to evaluate, whether the Poisson assumption 
has to be rejected on the basis of the available data (tests for over- or underdispersion). In 
cases where the H0-hypothesis of no over- or underdispersion has to be rejected, the most 
commonly used alternative to the Poisson model is the Negative Binomial model. The results 
of the Poisson– and the Negative Binomial Regression Model for analysing the innovation 
activities of 87 enterprises in German food industry in 2002 are reported in Table 2. 
                                                 
5    An extensive recent survey of specification and estimation of models of counts is available in 
Winkelmann (2000)   9
Table 2:   Regression results of the Poisson- and the Negative Binomial Regression Model 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Explanatory Variables  Symbol  Parameter  (t-value)  Parameter  (t-value) 
   Poisson Model  Neg. Bin. Model 
   [1]  [2] 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 Constant    2.4401  (16.244)
*** 1.6611  (2.791)
*** 
 Number  of  Products  #PROD 0.0006  (12.026)
*** 0.0009  (2.613)* 
  Retailer Market Power  RMP -0.3665  (-11.979)
*** -0.2668  (-2.311)
** 
 Market  Share  MAS 0.2513  (10.265)
*** 0.3076  (3.687)
*** 
 Competitive  Pressure  COMP -0.0192  (-0.211)  -0.0874  (-0.232) 
  Advertising to Sales Ratio  ASR -0.1065  (-5.206)
*** -0.0468  (-0.645) 
 R&D  Share  R&D 0.2048  (12.989)
*** 0.1986  (2.708)
*** 
 Export  Ratio  EXP -0.0225  (-7.648)
*** -0.0194  (-1.684)
* 
 Firm  Size  SIZE 0.0751  (3.912)
*** 0.0615  (0.620) 
 Market  Growth  GROWTH -0.0106  (-10.596)
*** -0.0036  (-0.771) 
 Dispersion  Parameter  ALPHA     0.7809  (5.301)
*** 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  Log Likelihood Function  LL(β) -560.5233  -285.8627 
  Restr. Log Likelih. Funct.  LL(0)  -912.0861  -560.5233 
  Likelihood Ratio Test  LRT (DF)  703.1256 (9)  549.3214 (1) 
 Deviance  G
2 819.0054 
 R
2 Cameron /Windmeijer  R
2
D 0.4619 
  Overdispersion Test 1  t1 12.4911 
  Overdispersion Test 2  t2 0.8721 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Remarks:  ** significance level = 1%; * significance level = 5%; LL(β) (and LL(0)) are the log of the 






i i i y y G
1
2 ) ˆ / ln( 2 λ . The calculation of R
2
D is described in detail in Cameron and Windmeijer 
(1993) and the overdispersion tests 1 and 2 are reported in Cameron and Trivedi (1990).  
 
Column [1] reports the results of the Poisson model. The t-tests of overdispersion (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1990) however clearly reject the assumption of equality of the conditional mean 
and variance functions in the Poisson model. The negative binomial regression model in 
column [2] has an additional parameter to estimate, which accounts for any difference in the 
conditional mean and variance functions  ]) [ 1 ]( [ ] [ i i i x x x i i i y E y E y Var α + = . The parameter 
α in column [2] is positive and significantly different from zero suggesting some degree of   10
overdispersion, the variance exceeds the mean. The following discussion thus refers to the 
results reported in column [2] on the basis of the Negative Binomial Model. 
 
Table 2 suggests a positive and significant impact of firm’s assortment size on new product 
introductions. With a larger number of products (#PROD) in a firm’s assortment, the 
necessity to replace specific (old) products in a given time period with new products 
increases. 
Study’s main attention is to investigate the impact of German food retailer’s market power on 
product innovations. Therefore we asked interviewed companies to give an evaluation of the 
retailers’ pricing pressure on a scale from 1 (retailer pricing pressure is very low) to 5 (retailer 
pricing pressure is very high). Nearly two-third of the respondents (32.18 per cent) affirm that 
retailer pricing pressure is high and very high, only 10.35 per cent report retailer pricing 
pressure to be low and very low. The theoretical model described in section 2 suggests a 
negative relationship between retailer market power and innovation activity in the upstream 
industry. The present study actually reveals an innovation reducing effect, which implies that 
retailers’ market power impedes new product introductions. The parameter estimate of RMP 
is negative and significantly different from zero at the 5%-level.  
Is this negative impact of market power in the downstream market mitigated if manufacturing 
firms also are concentrated and powerful (countervailing power)? According to Neo-
Schumpeter-hypothesis II, there is a high innovative potential of powerful firms because these 
firms a) have sufficient financial resources and accumulation of human capital, b) can realize 
economies of scale in producing innovations as well as c) have a strong incentive to establish 
market barriers to entry due to product innovation (‘efficiency effect’). Conversely it can be 
argued that firms with low market power undertake innovation to withstand the pressure of 
competition and “steal consumers” from competitors. Increasing competitive intensity forces 
to react quickly in order to remain competitive whereas firms with market power deter from 
product innovation since the new product would partially “steal consumers” from their own 
(profitable) old product (‘replacement effect’). Finally, a number of authors argue, that 
innovation is discouraged by both, too much or too little competition, and occurs when the 
degree of competition in an industry is in an intermediate range (Kantzenbach, 1966; Raider, 
1998; Baldwin et al., 2002; Dubey and Wu, 2002). The existing empirical literature reports 
mixed results. Whereas Gayle (2001) as well as Cabagnols and Le Bas (2002) find a positive 
relationship, Acs and Audretsch (1990), Geroski (1994), Röder et al. (2000) as well as   11
Gottschalk and Janz (2001) suggest a negative relationship between different measures of 
market power and innovative activity.  
This study uses different proxies for firm’s market power. Table 2 suggests that firms with a 
large market share (MAS) report significantly higher numbers of product innovations, the 
parameter estimate of MAS is positive and significantly different from zero. Firms have also 
been asked to evaluate the “degree of competition” in their primary product market. Again, 
firm’s response patterns are indicated from 1 (intensity of competition in industry is very low) 
to 5 (intensity of competition in industry is very high). For those firms reporting a high and 
very high intensity of competition (19.54 per cent), a dummy variable (COMP) is set equal to 
1. Including this variable, however, does not contribute to the explanatory power of the 
model. No significant relationship can further be observed between a variable indicating the 
existence of predatory pricing strategies or ‘price wars’ and innovation. We finally matched 
our data set with industry data to introduce aggregate (industry) concentration ratios as 
proxies for market structure. No significant effect of aggregate concentration ratios on the 
number of product innovations can be observed. Summarizing, there is al least some evidence 
in favour of the argument that product innovations are more frequent in firms with a larger 
market share. Their market power restrains the negative effect of retailer market power. 
Similar arguments have also been suggested with respect to the impact of entry barriers on 
innovation activities. Marketing activities can act as a barrier to entry as the potential entrant 
has to incur higher marketing expenditures than the established firm to convince the customer 
to buy his product instead of the incumbent’s product. In Table 2, the advertising to sales ratio 
(ASR) shows a negative impact on companies’ innovative activity, which is, however, not 
significantly different from zero. Similarly, a number of studies suggest that increasing R&D 
expenses imply a higher number of new product introductions (Galizzi and Venturini, 1996; 
Cabagnols and Le Bas, 2002). The results in Table 2 confirm these studies. The ratio of R&D 
expenditures to firm sales (R&D) exerts a significant positive influence on innovative activity. 
Firms have also been asked to directly evaluate the importance of entry barriers as well as to 
comment on the importance of fixed costs in their industry. Both measure however did not 
contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the model and are thus not reported in 
Table 2. 
To control for international competition, we include the ratio of exports to firm sales (EXQ). 
A strong international orientation might allow firms to flee competitive pressure on domestic 
markets as well as generate larger demand for new and different products thereby increasing 
incentives to innovate. Conversely, a strong international orientation of German firms might   12
also be an indication of a strong international competition on the local product market which 
would reduce incentives to develop new products. The parameter estimate for EXQ in Table 2 
is negative and significantly different from zero at the 10%-level, giving some support to the 
second interpretation.
6 Including a variable, that aims at directly measuring the respondent’s 
evaluation of foreign competitive pressures on a scale from 1 (foreign competitive pressure is 
very low) to 5 (foreign competitive pressure is very high) did not contribute to the explanatory 
power of the model. 
According to Neo-Schumpeter-hypothesis I, it is to emanate from a positive relationship 
between firm size and innovative activity due to better accouterment for introducing new 
products. Large companies, it is argued, would have an advantage in raising funds for risky 
innovation projects as they can cover capital requirements to a considerable proportion from 
own funds due to higher liquidity and have easier access to loans. Also large firms can spread 
fix costs over a large sales volume, thus reduce unit costs of production. Innovations would 
thus be more profitable in big companies. Further, large firms can undertake several 
innovation projects at the time and thereby spreading R&D-risk (Schumpeter,1942; Kamien 
and Schwartz,1982; Cohen and Levin,1989). The parameter estimates reported in column [2] 
of Table 2 do not support this argument though. Firm size, measured as sales per year (SIZE), 
did not show a significant impact on innovation activity.  
Finally, the theoretical model suggests the number of product innovations to increase with 
aggregate market size. On the basis of aggregate industry data, empirical support for the 
supposed positive relationship between market size and innovative activity is reported in 
Galizzi and Venturini (1996), Gayle (2001) as well as Baldwin et al. (2002), whereas Acs and 
Audretsch (1990) as well as Rothwell and Dogson (1994) find the opposite result. The present 
study uses past industry growth between 1995 and 1999 (GROWTH) as a proxy for future 
demand potentials. The parameter estimate of this variable reported in Table 2 however is not 
significantly different from zero. Other measures of market size (such as industry sales) also 
did not show any significant relationship with innovation activities in German food industries. 
 
4. Summary 
Rapidly growing concentration ratios in European food retailing raise concerns about the 
welfare implications for consumers. On the one hand, consumers might gain if lower input 
prices for retailers are passed on to consumers. In the long run, however, retailer power might 
                                                 
6    A negative relationship between foreign trade and innovation has also been found by Traill and 
Meulenberg (2002).   13
force manufacturers to reduce investment in new products which would reduce consumer 
welfare. The relationship between downstream (retailer) market power and upstream (food 
manufacturing) product innovation is the focus of this paper. On the basis of a formal model, 
we find that retailer market power reduces upstream firms incentives to introduce new 
products. This proposition is then tested empirically. 
In contrast to much of the existing literature on product innovation, which is based on cross-
section (aggregate) industry data, we use firm level data from a survey of food manufacturing 
firms carried out in 2002 in Germany. The results of a negative binomial regression model 
supports the proposition of a negative effect of retailer market power on product innovation in 
food manufacturing. This negative impact of market power in the downstream market is 
mitigated if manufacturing firms also have some market power (countervailing power). 
Innovations are positively related to firm’s market share in food manufacturing. Further, we 
find firm’s expenditures in R&D to be significantly and positively related to product 
innovation. 
There has been considerable debate over the appropriate policy treatment towards buyer 
power. Our results underline the necessity to incorporate the long-run implications with 
respect to product innovation into competition policy considerations. 
   14
Reference 
Acs, Z.J. and D.B. Audretsch (1990), Innovation and Small Firms. Cambridge. 
Baldwin, J.; Hanel, P. and D. Sabourin (2002), Determinants of Innovative Activity in 
Canadian Manufacturing Firms. In: Kleinknecht, A. and P. Mohnen (2002): Innovation and 
Firm Performance. Econometric Explorations of Survey data. Basingstoke, pp. 86-111. 
Cabagnols, A. and C. Le Bas (2002), Differences in the Determinants of Product and Process 
Innovations: The French Case. In: Kleinknecht, A. and P. Mohnen (2002), Innovation and 
Firm Performance. Econometric Explorations of Survey data. Basingstoke, pp.112-149. 
Cameron, A. and P. Trivedi (1990), Regression Based Tests for Overdispersion in the Poisson 
Model. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 46, pp. 347-364. 
Cameron, A., and F. Windmeijer (1993), R-Squared Measures for Count Data Regression 
Models with Applications to Health Care Utilization, Department of Economics, University of 
California, Working Paper No. 93-24. 
Clarke, R.; Davies, S.; Dobson, P. and M. Waterson (2002), Buyer Power and Competition in 
European Food Retailing. Northampton. 
Cohen, W.M. and R. C. Levin (1989), Empirical Studies of innovation and Market Structure. 
In: Schmalensee, R. and R.D. Willig (1989), Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol. II, 
Amsterdam, pp. 1059-1107. 
Dubey, P. and C. Wu (2002), When less competition induces more product innovation. 
Economics letters, Vol. 74, issue 3, pp. 309-312. 
EC (1999), Buyer Power and its Impact on Competition in the Food Retail Distribution Sector 
of the European Union. Report produced for the European Commission, DG IV, Brussels. 
Ellison, S.F. and C.M. Snyder (2001), Countervailing power in wholesale pharmaceuticals. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics. Working paper No. 01/27. 
Federation of German Food and Drink Industries (BVE) (2001), Presse-Taschenbuch 
Ernährung. Seefeld. 
FTC (2000), Entering the 21
st Century: Competition Policy in the World of B2B Electronic 
Marketplaces. Report by the Federal Trade Commission Staff, Washington, D.C. 
Galizzi, G and L. Venturini (1996), Economics of Innovation. The Case of Food Industry. 
Heidelberg.   15
Gayle, P.G. (2001), Market Concentration and Innovation: New Empirical Evidence on the 
Schumpeterian Hypothesis. University of Colorado at Boulder, Center of Economic Analysis, 
Working Paper No. 01-14. 
Geroski, P.A. (1994), Market Structure, Corporate Performance and Innovative Activity. 
Oxford. 
Gottschalk, S. and N. Janz (2001), Innovation Dynamics and Endogenous Market Structure. 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Working Paper No. 01-39. 
Inderst, R. and C. Wey (2002), Buyer power and supplier incentives. Centre for Economic 
Policy Research. Workingpaper No. 3547. 
Kamien, M.I. and N. Schwartz (1982), Market structure and innovation. Cambridge. 
Kantzenbach, E. (1966), Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs. Göttingen. 
Katz, J.M. (1987), The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate 
Goods Markets. American Economic Review, Vol. 77, pp. 154-167.  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1997), The 
Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities. Proposed Guidelines for collecting 
and Interpreting Technological Innovation data. Oslo. 
Madakom (Ed.) (2001), Innovationsreport 2001. Köln. 
Raider, H.J. (1998), Market Structure and Innovation. Social Science Research, Vol. 27, pp. 
1-21. 
Röder, C; Herrmann, R. and J.M. Connor (2000), Determinants of New Product Introductions 
in the US Food Industry: A Panel-model Approach. Applied Economic Letters, Vol. 7, pp. 
743-748. 
Rothwell, R. and M. Dogson (1994), Innovation and Size of Firm. In: Rothwell, R. and M. 
Dogson (1994), The Handbook of Industrial Innovation. Aldershot. 
Scherer, F.M. and D. Ross (1990), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 
Boston et al. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942), Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York. 
Stefanides, C. (1997), Downstream Vertical Foreclosure and Upstream Innovation, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol. 45, pp. 445-456.   16
Sullivan, M.W. (1997), Slotting allowances and the market for new products. The journal of 
law & economics, Vol. 40, issue 2, pp. 461-493. 
Traill, W.B. and M. Meulenberg (2002), Innovation in the Food Industry. Agribusiness, Vol. 
18, issue 1, pp. 1-21. 
Winkelmann, R. (2000), Econometric Analysis of Count Data. Berlin et al. 